Conference Calls and Information Asymmetry

Conference Calls and Information Asymmetry
Author(s): Brown, Stephen and Hillegeist, Stephen A. and Lo, Kin
Year: 2003
Paper Number: GBS-ACC-2003-009
Goizueta Department: Accounting

Abstract

We hypothesize that conference calls are voluntary disclosures that lead to long-term reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Cross-sectional and time-series tests show that the level of information asymmetry is negatively associated with conference call activity. We find that firms initiating a policy of holding periodic conference calls experience a sustained reduction in information asymmetry (although one-time callers experience no significant decline in asymmetry). Since prior work has shown that the cost of equity capital is increasing with information asymmetry, our results suggest that firms that hold conference calls more frequently have lower costs of capital.